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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The legal theories advanced by Plaintiff are incorrect applications of

the

Law

as

it

existed

at

the time

of trial.

There was no marriage between Plaintiff and decedent.

There

were no grounds established or facts alleged or proven, which
would support the imposition of a constructive trust or setting
aside a deed transferring real property located at 4145 Barker
Road, Taylorsville,

Utah

(hereinafter

cited

as

"Barker

Road

property'1) from decedent.
There was no legally recognizable relationship to base an
award of any property in decedent's estate to Plaintiff.
The findings of the trial court were not supported by clear and
convincing evidence.
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ARGUMENT
I.

NO RECOGNIZABLE RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN DECEDENT

AND PLAINTIFF TO BASE AN ORDER AWARDING PLAINITFF AN EQUITABLE
DIVISION OF PROPERTY IN DECEDENT'S ESTATE.
Plaintiff claims to be entitled to a division of property
in appellant's estate and argues that such division should be
governed by

equitable

principles.

(A.) Equitable property

division

Plaintiff's

theories

in the marital

(B.) Imposition of constructive trusts.

are:

context and,

(Plaintiff's Brief at

9-12).
Plaintiff cites "U.C.A. Sec. 30-1-7.2" (sic) as the basis
for a division of property in a marital setting.

Presumably Utah

Code Annot. §30-1-17.2 (1971) is meant as the correct section.
Utah Code Annot. §30-1-17.2 (1971) is a subsection of Utah Code
Annot. §30-1-17(1971) entitled "Action to determine validity of a
marriage - Judgment of validity or annulment".
states that it applies
of a marriage ..."

The first sentence

lf

[w]hen there is doubt as to the validity

Likewise, Utah Code Annot.

§30-1-17.2 concerns

the accumulation of property or obligations "subsequent to the
marriage...".

There was no marriage in the instant case.

(Trans-

cript 5, 40, 41, hereinafter cited as "Tr.").
The cases cited by Plaintiff in support of her theory of
equitable property division in a marital context are based on the
existence of a marriage.

The cases are all distinguishable from

this action on the facts as follows:
-2-

i

In Maple v, Maple, 566 P.2d 1229 (Utah, 1977), this court
affirmed the award of a $1,200 settlement in an annulment of a
marriage.

566 P.2d at 1230.

The award was to provide money to

plaintiff who was a citizen of Thailand so as to enable her to
return there. Id.

There is no similar need, nor was there a

marriage, in the instant case.
Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah, 1977) was an action to
partition a house atid business assets.
which was later invalidated.

There was a marriage

572 P.2d at 406.

proceeded in contract rather than equity.
purchased jointly

and

payment

made

from

The court below

Id.
a

The house was

business

Plaintiff shared in the operation of the business.

Id.

account.
Based on

these facts, which again are not present in the instant case,
this Court upheld the award to one-third interest in the house
and a cash settlement to plaintiff.

572 P.2d at 407.

In Parks V. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d

590 (Utah,

1983), this Court upheld the imposition of a constructive trust
in a factual situation in which a marital relationship existed.
Speaking through Chief Justice Hall, the Court found:
[t]his evidence clearly and adequately supports the
trial court's finding that plaintiff's labors and
earnings were responsible for the acquisition of a
substantial portion of the marital estate. It is
therefore appropriate to conclude that plaintiff had
an "equitable interest" in the subject property, and
that the total inclusion of such property in the
estate of Mrs. Parks constituted an "unjust enrichment" of her estate. Accordingly, we hold that the
trial court's imposition of a constructive trust
upon the estate of Mrs. Parks was justified, at

-3-

least as to that portion representing plaintiff's
proven interest therein.
Parks, 673 P.2d at 600.
In our case, Plaintiff was not, through her labors or earnings, responsible
estate."

for

a

"substantial

portion

of

the

marital

Further, there was no marriage, and no "marital" estate

to be divided.
Plaintiff's reliance upon this first theory (marital relationship) is misplaced.

As discussed, Utah Code Annot. §30-1-17.2

(1971) is inapplicable as are the cases cited.

The award of

property by the trial court, imposition of a constructive trust,
and setting aside the deed conveying the Barker Road property was
error.
The several
the existance

arguments

of a

propounded

confidential

by

Plaintiff

relationship

and

regarding

grounds for

the imposition of a constructive trust are discussed in the Brief
of Appellant.

A recent case which has come to Defendant's atten-

tion is Hiltsley v. Ryder, 59 Utah Adv. Rep. 35(1987).

It con-

cerns the imposition of a constructive trust in a marital relationship.

While the majority did not reach the merits of the

trust imposition, Justice Zimmerman

in his concurring

opinion

discusses the law of constructive trusts and the application of
Section 160 of the Restatement of Restitution.
Justice Zimmerman stated that the burden of proof required
of the proponent of a constructive trust "cannot be met by simply

-4-

showing that there was a transaction between the parties apparently to the benefit of one and that they had a close family relationship." Hiltsley, 59 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. He cited Matter of
Estate of Coffin, 137 Ariz. 480, 671 P. 2d 921 (Ariz. Ct. App.,
1983) for the proposition that
[i]n order to impose a constructive trust, in addition
to the family relationship, there must be shown [the
grantor's] age and infirmity on the one hand, actual
dominance on the part of the grantee, and established
course of management of the grantor's affairs by the
grantee, or other similar facts making it inequitable
to allow the grantee to prevail.
Matter of Estate of Coffin, 137 Ariz, at 482, 671 P2d at 923.
Justice Zimmerman found nothing in the record of Hiltsley
to support a finding of constructive trust particularly in light
of the clear and convincing evidentiary standard required.
Utah Adv. Rep. at 37.

59

He also concluded that the "imposition of

a constructive trust was based on nothing more than conjecture"
and advised the trial court that "it erred in finding a constructive trust on the state of the facts before it."

Id.

The case at bar is likewise devoid of evidence to support a
constructive trust.

There was no finding of a confidential

relationship, nor could there have been.

The trial record is

replete with evidence contrary to that required by Hiltsley.
Particularly the Barker Street property transaction which was
admitted by Plaintiff to be of her own free will.

(Tr. 9, 10,

42). The trial court erred in setting aside the deed and imposing
a constructive trust.
-5-

II.

THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE NOT BASED ON CLEAR

AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
Plaintiff argues that all of the evidence presented by her
was uncontroverted and the findings of the trial court were based
on clear and convincing evidence.

This assertion is incorrect.

An example of how erroneous Plaintiff's argument is, is evidenced
by the finding of a relationship creating a common-law marriage
when it was not recognized in Utah.
The trial judge refused to hear testimony of a competent
witness concerning decedent's views of the relationship and intentions concerning the property.
would have

directly

points, jki.

contradicted

(Tr.

61-65).

Plaintiff's

This testimony

testimony

on all

As discussed in Appellant's brief, this testimony

was admissible and should have been heard.

It was error of the

court to exclude it.
Plaintiff, in further support of her position, cites a number of cases and one statute, Utah Code Annot. §30-1-17 (1971).
She does not discuss the elements which satisfy this evidentiary
standard, such as fraud, duress or undue influence.
The cases cited by Plaintiff and the statute again all deal
with legally

recognized

marital

relationships.

Parks, Maple,

Edgar and Utah Code Annot. §30-1-17.2 (1971) have already been
distinguished on

the

facts

and

application

from

this

case.

Plaintiff cites Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah, 1987) in

support of her position that she is entitled to a share of Decedent's estate.

Burke was a divorce action where the parties had

been married for approximately thirteen years.
In Burke, Defendant

733 P.2d at 134.

claimed the court committed

error in not

awarding him an interest in property that had been inherited by
his wife during

their marriage.

Without agreeing

that

Burke

applies, the only value it appears to have, in an examination of
our facts, is the court's discussion of equitable property division
in a divorce setting.

That court stated that

[t]he factors generally to be considered are the amount
and kind of property to be divided; whether the property
was acquired before or during the marriage; the source
of the property; the health of the parties; the parties'
standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs
and earning capacities; the duration of the marriage; the
children of the marriage;
the parties' ages at time of
marriage and of divorce; what the parties gave up by the
marriage; and the necessary relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony and child support to be
awarded. Of particular concern in a case such as this is
whether one spouse has made any contribution toward the
growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether
the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts
of the parties.
773 P 2d. at 135.
Implicit in the court's analysis is, of course, the fact
that a marital relationship existed.

Assuming arguendo that such

a relationship did exist, an examination of the relevant factors
illustrates the inequity of the lower court's order in awarding
Plaintiff an interest in the West Leisure property.

First of

all, the parties' relationship was of a relatively short duration.

-7-

The residence on West Leisure was acquired by the Decedent during
his first marriage*
his heirs at law.

It was there where he raised his children,

Plaintiff made no contribution toward the pur-

chase, growth in value or enhancement in value of the West Leisure residence.

Our action does not deal with a divorce and is

distinguishable from Burke

on the facts, application of law and

holding.
Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d

781(Utah, 1986), alfeo rel/ied

upon by Defendant again deals with a divorce and property settlement pursuant to a decree of divorce.
were married for fifty-one years.

In

that case, the parties

716 P. 2d at 781.

of the instant case are not similar to those in

The facts

Burnham.

There

was no marriage, nor was there a long-term relationship approaching that found in Burnham.
The Burnham

case

cited

by Plaintiff

is helpful

in that

it accurately states the burden placed on Defendant in appealing a property division as follows:
[a] party appealing from a property division has the
burden to prove that there was a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly preponderated
against the finding; or such a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
716 P.2d at 782.
Defendant is confident that this burden has been met.

The

record clearly reflects there was at least a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law, if not a clear abuse of discretion,

-8-

when the lower court found and relied on a common law marriage
to support an order setting aside a deed and dividing property
of decedent's estate.

The trial court erred when it set aside

that deed and imposed a constructive trust on the West Leisure
and other property held by the estate of decedent without finding
any elements required to impose such a trust.
III. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DOES NOT DISTRIBUTE THE
PROPERTY IN

DECEDENT'S

ESTATE

EQUITABLY

BETWEEN

THE PARTIES.

Plaintiff believes that the order of the trial court was a
fair and reasonable distribution of the assets in which she and
decedent had an interest.

Yet she admits she held no right,

title or interest in the Barker Road property after she transferred
it to decedent,

(Tr. 10, 42, 45) or in the West Leisure Circle

property (Tr. 42-44).
Plaintiff cites her own uncontroverted testimony and Burke
to support her position.

Burke

has already been distinguished

from the instant case in section II of this brief.

The reason

Plaintiff's testimony was uncontroverted was because the trial
court erroneously refused to hear evidence which would have contradicted it.

This issue is discussed in the Brief of Appellant.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's argument and the lower court order are contrary
to the law of this State.

There was no marriage nor were there

any findings to support an order setting aside the Barker Road

-9-

deed or the imposing a constructive trust on property of decedent's
estate.

The deed transferring the Barker Road property to decedent

must be reinstated and the constructive trust lifted from the
property of the estate of decedent.
DATED this

day of August, 1987.

JERRALD D. CONDER
Attorney for Appellant
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30-1-29

As used in this act, the word "obligor" shall meai
a person who is obligated t o support a minor chile
I o r children under a temporary o r permanent ordei
30-1-16. Misconduct of county clerk - Penalty.
Every clerk o r deputy clerk who knowingly issues or judgment of any court or administrative body.
1971
a license for any prohibited marriage shall be puni- Note: Section 30-1-26 through 30-1-29 were declared unconsshed b y confinement in the state prison for a term titational by the Third Jadidal District Court, Sail Lake County, tad
are aot enforced panaaat to Utah Attorney General's opinion lettei
not exceeding two years, or by fine in any sum not dated
May 22.197S.
exceeding $1,000, or by both such fine and impris- 30-1*27. Marriage by person under prior support
onment, and upon conviction shall be removed from
obligation - Unlawful to apply for license
his office by the judgment of the court before which
without complying with act.
his conviction is had; a n d if h e willfully issues a
It shall be unlawful for an obligor to marry or
license contrary to his duty as herein prescribed, he apply for a marriage license in this state or, if the
shall be fined not exceeding S1,000.
1953 obligor is domiciled in this state, t o marry or apply
30-1-17. Action to determine validity of marriage
for a marriage license in another state, without first
- Judgment of validity or annulment.
complying with Section 30-1-28.
W69
When there is doubt as t o the validity of a marr- 30-1-28. Marriage by person under prior support
iage, either party may, in a court of equity in a
obligation • Verified statements - Court order
county where either party is domiciled, demand its
required if delinquent in payments.
avoidance or affirmance, but when o n e of the
(1) A t the time of filing the marriage license
parties was under the age of consent at the time of application, the obligor shall file with the clerk a
the marriage, the other party, being of proper age, verified statement, signed by the person whom the
shall have n o such proceeding for that cause against obligor proposes t o marry, stating that he o r she
the party under age. The judgment in the action understands the nature of the support obligation of
shall either declare the marriage valid or annulled the obligor a n d any additional information prescrand shall be conclusive upon all persons concerned ibed by the district judges.
with the marriage. T
W7i
(2) At the time of filing the marriage license.
30-1-17.1. Annulment - Grounds for.
application, the obligor shall file with the clerk a
A marriage may be annulled for any of the foll- verified statement signed by the person, agency,
owing causes existing at the time of marriage:
institution or other entity having custody of the
(1) when the marriage is prohibited or void under minor children, stating that the obligor is not then
chapter 1 of Title 30.
in default in the support obligation and any additi(2) upon grounds existing at c o m m o n law.
1971 onal information prescribed by the district judges,
30-1-17.2. Action to determine validity of
or
(3) If the obligor is unable t o file the statement
marriage - Orders relating to parties, property
prescribed under Subsection (2), the obligor shall
and children - Legitimacy of children.
If the parties have accumulated any property o r file a certified copy of a court order authorizing the
acquired any obligations subsequent t o the marriage, issuance of a marriage license to the obligor. A
or there is a genuine need arising from economic petition for the order shall be upon forms prescribed
change of circumstances due t o the marriage, or if by the district court judges a n d furnished by the
there are children born, o r expected, the court may clerk of the court and shall be filed with the district
make temporary and final orders, and subsequently court in t h e county where (a) the court order o r
modify t h e orders, relating t o the parties, their judgment of support was rendered, if in Utah; or
property a n d obligations, the children a n d their (b) the minor children are domiciled, if in Utah; o r
custody and visitation, a n d the support a n d maint- (c) the obligor is domiciled, if in Utah; o r (d) if
enance of the parties and children, as may be equi- none of the foregoing is applicable, the county
table. The children born t o the parties after the date where the obligor is making application for a marof the marriage, shall be deemed the legitimate chi- riage license.
The court shall order a hearing upon the petition
ldren of both of the parties for all purposes.
1971
and the clerk shall cause a copy of the petition to be
30-1-17.3. Age as basis of action to determine
personally served upon the person, agency, instituvalidity of marriage • Refusal to grant
tion o r other entity having custody of the minor
annulment.
If an action to determine the validity of a marr- children unless the court, for good cause, shall
iage is commenced upon the ground that o n e o r waive service.
The court shall consider factors relating t o the
both of the parties were prohibited from marriage
because of their age, in addition t o all of the fore- petitioner's past performance a n d future ability to
going provisions, the following shall apply: T h e comply with the prior court order in approving o r
provisions of this code regarding marriage by a denying the petition.
(4) A refusal of the district court t o issue an order
person o r persons under the age of consent t o the
authorizing
the issuance of a marriage license t o the
contrary notwithstanding, the court may, in its disobligor
shall
be an appealable order. A prior refusal
cretion, refuse t o grant an annulment if it finds that
it is in the best interest of the parties o r their chil- shall not prejudice the right of the obligor to file
dren, to refuse the annulment. T h e refusal shall subsequent petitions showing that the circumstances
make the marriage valid and subsisting for all pur- of the obligor have changed and the obligor is able
19(9
poses.
ifTl to meet the support obligation.
30-1-29. Marriage by person under prior support
30-1-17.4. Action for annulment or divorce as
obligation - Leaving state to marry a
alternative relief.
misdemeanor.
Nothing herein shall be construed t o prevent the
A n y domicilary of this state t o w h o m the provisfiling of an action requesting an annulment o r a I ions
o f thic *j»/M^.- —
••
divorce as alternative relief.
1971
30-1-18 through 30-1-25. Repealed.
"»«
eding SI ,000 or be both so fined and imprisoned.

1953

